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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This appellate review arises from the denial of a claim for workers' compensation 
benefits arising from a claimed occupational disease. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over this proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(a)(1953, 
as amended), Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-801(8)(1997) and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues in this case are mixed questions of law and fact. As such, this Court 
extends "heightened deference" to the Commission's determinations with "varying degrees 
of strictness, falling anywhere between a review of correctness and a broad abuse of 
discretion standard." Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 1823 (Utah 1977). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 34A-3-103 (1953, as amended), contains the Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. This Act, in part, provides that: 
A compensable occupational disease means any disease or 
illness that arises out of and in the course of employment and 
is medically caused or aggravated by that employment. 
The Statute is attached to Appellant's Brief as Addendum "A." 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant was employed by appellee Convergys as a telemarketer. Her job 
consisted primarily of providing customer service through the use of a telephone and 
computer. (Rl at 14). During the course of her employment with Convergys, she 
complained of pain and tenderness in both hands, reporting that her condition was due to the 
repetitive motion of her employment duties. 
The employee was diagnosed by Dr. Corey Anden with chronic left upper 
extremity/elbow pain with chronic pain/overuse syndrome, cubital tunnel syndrome, medial 
epicondylitis and a past history of wrist flexor tendinitis. (R2 at 92). For these conditions, 
Dr. Anden assigned a 3% whole person impairment rating. Dr. Charles Bean diagnosed the 
employee with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, cubital tunnel syndrome on the left, flexor 
tendinitis in the left elbow and possible mild distal flexor tendinitis. (R2 at 5). 
The employee was referred to a medical panel which after reviewing her medical 
records and examining her, assigned a 3% whole person impairment rating for "painful 
organic syndrome and concluded that only part of the medical care for which she sought 
treatment was reasonably medically necessary to treat her industrial disease." (Rl at 45). 
Objections to the medical panel were filed by the appellant and overruled by the 
administrative law judge. 
On June 29, 2002, the administrative law judge entered Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order which denied further compensation for the employee. (Rl 
at 41-52). A Motion for Review was filed by the employee with the Labor Commission of 
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Utah which was denied based upon their acceptance of the administrative law judge's 
decision. (Rl at 74-76). 
The Utah Labor Commission properly and fully considered the appellant's Motion 
for Review as evidenced by its Order denying said Motion. (Rl at 74-76). While the facts 
were not specifically noted in its Order, the ample facts as contained in the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order entered by the administrative law judge provided more 
than enough evidence to support the denial. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Following the issuance of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order by 
the administrative law judge, the employee filed a Motion for Review. In response to this 
Motion, the Labor Commission prepared an Order denying appellant's Motion. This denial 
was based on the Commission's accepting and adopting the decision by the administrative 
law judge. While this Order did not specifically reference each objection raised by the 
employee, the decision which was adopted contained the evidence and facts upon which 
their denial was properly and adequately supported. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
FACTUAL DISPUTES ARE DECIDED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
JUDGE 
Appellees readily agree with the appellant that within Utah's workers' compensation 
law, few principles are as established as that the Workers' Compensation Act should be 
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construed "liberally and in favor of coverage when statutory terms reasonably admit of such 
a conclusion." Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990). However, this 
standard does not direct that anytime there are issues in dispute or contradictory evidence 
introduced, the administrative law judge must rule in favor of the employee. 
The submission of contrary evidence by the parties to an action occurs in nearly 
every case. In workers compensation cases, each party generally is able to find a physician 
or other medical professional to provide a diagnosis or opinion that supports their theory. 
In such matters, the pivotal question often becomes whose evidence is most compelling. 
As such, the authority to decide which evidence is persuasive is necessary to 
resolving these cases. In workers compensation, the authority to make such decisions 
properly rests upon the administrative law judge. The Utah Supreme Court clearly and 
unequivocally established this standard when it held, "that where medical evidence is 
conflicting, 'it is the responsibility of the administrative law judge to resolve factual 
conflicts.5" Olsen v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 776 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1989) citing 
Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev.. 736 P.2d 237, 241 (Utah 1987). 
The duty to resolve factual disputes as to medical evidence is complicated by the 
roles the various medical providers in a case may play. Employees will generally have at 
least one treating physician along with other doctors who have expertise in a particular field 
of medicine. While on the other hand, there are often physicians hired by employers to 
examine the employee and provide an opinion as to her condition. Finally, the 
administrative judge may convene a medical panel to provide additional insight into the 
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medical issues at hand. 
While the administrative law judge must certainly consider the source of medical 
evidence and factor any potential for bias into her decision, the Supreme Court of Utah has 
seen "no reason for creating a presumption in favor of particular evidence." Rushton v. 
Gelco Express, 732 P.2d 109, 112 (Utah 1986). Furthermore, decisions from the Utah 
Supreme Court have "repeatedly reaffirmed the fact-finding role of the Commission and 
have stated that the Commission must look at all relevant evidence in reaching its findings 
without being restricted to give evidence from specific witnesses more weight than that 
from other witnesses. Id At 111 See Shipley v. C&W Contracting Co.. 528 P.2d 153, 155 
(Utah 1974) (the Commission is not necessarily bound to accept the opinions of any 
witness or witnesses, expert or otherwise); Mollerup Van Lines v. Adams, 398 P.2d 882, 
885 (Utah 1965) (the Commission had both the prerogative and duty to view the entire 
testimony of the medical panel doctor and believe those statements that impressed it). 
In the case at hand, the administrative law judge was presented with conflicting 
medical evidence pertaining to the nature of the employee's injuries, her date of maximum 
medical improvement and the extent of her permanent impairment. As such, the 
administrative law judge referred several issue pertaining to her physical condition and 
medical treatment to a medical panel. (Rl at 41-52). The medical panel evaluated the 
employee and her medical records and issued its report on May 3, 2002. (Rl at 45). 
The administrative law judge, in the Findings of Fact, noted that evidence from the 
employee's treating physicians, the physician she was referred to by the employer's 
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insurance company, the physician which the employee's attorney referred her to and the 
medical panel was considered. (Rl at 21-52). The Conclusions of Law set forth, that based 
on a "preponderance of the evidence in the record," all necessary medical care and 
compensation related to employee's occupational disease was paid. (Rl at 41-52). 
A review of the record clearly establishes that the medical evidence was such that 
even a liberal construction of the Workers Compensation Act in favor of employee 
coverage does not operate in the employee's favor. The medical opinions of Dr. Anden and 
the medical panel, chaired by Dr. Holmes, provide ample and credible evidence to support 
the administrative law judge's findings. (R2 at 92 and Rl at 45). While the employee 
submitted the contrary opinion of Dr. Bean, the administrative law judge, properly and 
pursuant to her authority, made a judgement as to the persuasiveness of the varying medical 
evidence and made a decision supported by a preponderance of the evidence in the record. 
(R2 at 5-8). 
n 
SUFFICIENT FACTS EXIST AND HAVE BEEN REFERENCED BY THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE AND LABOR COMMISSION TO SUPPORT 
THEIR HOLDINGS 
The appellant contends that the Labor Commission of Utah arbitrarily and 
capriciously denied her Motion for Review. However, a careful reading of the Order 
Denying Motion for Review prepared by the Commission clearly indicates that the denial 
was properly considered and the necessary facts supporting their decision were set forth. 
In order for a meaningful review of Labor Commission decisions, the findings must 
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be "sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Nvrehn v. Industrial 
Commission. 800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah App. 1990) cert denied. 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). 
In this case, it is clear that sufficiently detailed facts were promulgated by which a proper 
review of the case was readily achievable. 
In the Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Order, the administrative law judge 
provided a detailed and exhaustive summation of the relevant facts. (Rl at 41-52). In fact, 
the Findings of Fact addressed not only those facts which supported the administrative law 
judge's ultimate decision, but also those facts, namely the conclusions reached by Dr. 
Bean, that were contrary to her Order. See, Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, P.2d. 
63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (The Court, in reviewing the board's factual findings, must review 
the evidence supporting and detracting from the weight of the board's evidence). 
While the employee, in her Motion for Review, disputed two items contained in the 
Findings of Fact, the dates of her employment with Convergys and the amount of her 
permanent partial disability compensation, at no point were the sufficiency of the findings 
questioned. While the Labor Commission, in its Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for 
Review, did not specifically note findings of fact, they did make it abundantly clear that 
they were adopting those promulgated by the administrative law judge as their own. (Rl at 
74-76). 
In the Labor Commission's Order, it is specifically noted that the Commission 
"accepts and adopts Judge Eblen's decision in this matter." (Rl at 76). By accepting and 
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adopting this decision, the Commission is not only making the administrative law judge's 
Order its own, it is making the facts used in reaching that decision its own. Without 
accepting the information that led to the administrative law judge's Order, it would be 
difficult for the Commission to adopt and accept her ultimate decision. 
Ill 
ISSUES RAISED IN APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR REVIEW WERE 
PROPERLY ADDRESSED BY THE LABOR COMMISSION 
The appellant contends that the Labor Commission failed to address all of the issue 
she raised in her Motion for Review. While the Labor Commission did not make specific 
reference in its Order to each of the issues presented by the employee, it is clear that they 
were effectively and properly dealt with or the issues were so tangential as to render non-
consideration a harmless error. 
Maximum Medical Improvement 
The employee claims that the administrative law judge implied in her Findings of 
Fact (Rl at 44) that Dr. Anden agreed with the maximum medical improvement date, June 
27, 2000, established by Dr. Hammon. As the employee noted, this would be difficult as 
Dr. Anden's earliest opinion regarding this issue could be July 20, 2000 as this was the first 
visit with the employee after her examination by Dr. Hammon. 
While the Commission did not make specific reference to this issue in its Order, 
the fact that they adopted the findings of the administrative law judge effectively settles this 
issue. In the Findings of Fact, Finding number 15, it is noted that 
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On July 20, 2000, the petitioner returned to see Dr. Anden. 
Dr. Anden agreed the petitioner was medically stable and 
assigned a 3% upper extremity permanent impairment for 
moderate upper extremity painful organic syndrome under 
the Utah 1997 Impairment Guides. (Rl at 44). 
A plain language review of this Finding clearly indicates that the administrative law judge 
was not stating a date on which Dr. Anden agreed that the employee had reached maximum 
medical improvement, but was simply indicating that Dr. Anden agreed that maximum 
medical improvement had been reached. By simply adopting the accurate statement of 
facts by the administrative law judge, the Commission could properly conclude that an 
error as to the date Dr. Anden indicated that maximum medical improvement was reached 
was clearly not made. 
The employee also contends that the administrative law judge improperly noted that 
she had been treated by Dr. Anden from June 5, 1998 through July 20, 2000. While she is 
correct that Dr. Anden provided medical care for the employee beginning on April 3, 2000, 
it is not clear that this incorrect information was considered by the administrative law judge 
and Commission. 
In Findings of Fact 11, the employee's first visit to Dr. Anden is detailed and 
properly noted to be on April 3, 2000. (Rl at 43). The administrative law judge, in the 
Analysis section of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, notes that "Dr. 
Anden provided conservative care to the petitioner from June 5, 1998. . ." (Rl at 47). In 
actuality, the June 5, 1998 date is when the employee began physical therapy for her left 
upper extremity pain. 
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Even if the administrative law judge and Commission improperly assumed that Dr. 
Anden had been the employee's physician for approximately two years longer than she had, 
this would not serve to make her medical opinion any more or less credible. There is not 
any indication that Dr. Anden5s medical opinion would be less credible or less worthy of 
consideration if her treatment began in 2000. As such, this error would have no bearing on 
the Order and as such, is properly considered harmless. 
Overuse Syndrome 
Appellant states that the diagnosis of "overuse syndrome" by Dr. Anden and the 
medical panel is not medically recognized and thus renders their opinions void of 
credibility. This assertion is simply not based on any persuasive or compelling evidence. 
The employee points to the fact that "overuse syndrome" is not specifically noted in 
the 9th Edition of the International Classified Diseases, Clinical Modifications. He further 
claims that as this condition is not noted in this publication, it is simply an "administrative 
diagnosis that is not recognized by medical practitioners." 
A review of International Classified Diseases indicates that while it is a very 
comprehensive guide, it clearly does not set forth each and every condition which a person 
may contract or suffer. In fact, this guide uses broad categories in which many different 
conditions could be placed. For example, under the section "Mononeuritis of upper limb & 
mononeuritis multiplex," there is a category for "other mononeuritis of upper limb." 
Under "Hereditary & idiopathic peripheral neuropathy," there is a category for 
"Unspecified idiopathic peripheral neuropathy." 
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While these categories may be utilized in submitting claims to insurance companies 
or categorizing health conditions for statistical purposes, they do not provide clear details 
as to the condition suffered by the patient. The ailment is merely cataloged in a broad and 
non-specific category. While "overuse syndrome" may not be specifically identified in this 
publication, there are sufficient broad categories in which such a diagnosis could be placed. 
In fact, it is not unusual for this diagnosis to be given. A review of cases from around the 
country shows that there are at least 154 cases in which a party to an action has this exact 
diagnosis. 
Finally, there is not a legal standard which requires diagnosis accepted by an 
administrative law judge to be found in International Classified Diseases. The fact that 
"overuse syndrome" is not specifically mention is irrelevant to this case. As such, the 
Labor Commission, by accepting and adopting the administrative law judge's decision, 
established that this diagnosis in this case was supported by the medical evidence. 
Reasonable and Necessary Medical Care and Whole Person Impairment 
Rating 
Appellant contends that the Labor Commission failed to properly consider the 
administrative law judge's denial of medical care benefits and reconsideration of permanent 
total impairment. The request for continued medical care and adjustment of employee's 
impairment rating were properly and appropriately addressed in the Order Denying the 
Motion for Review and deemed to not be supported by the facts and evidence. 
At the hearing of this matter, the employee submitted medical records from Dr. 
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Bean. Dr. Bean examined the employee and requested that further diagnostic testing, 
specifically an MRI and wrist arthrogram, be conducted and that she should qualify for a 
20% impairment rating. (R2 at 5). However, the medical panel concluded that the 
appropriate testing and treatment which could be related to her occupational disease had 
been completed and the impairment rating was based on improper criteria. As noted 
previously, this medical panel report, including the opinion that further testing was not 
occupationally related and that an adjustment in the impairment rating was not warranted, 
was adopted by the administrative law judge. 
These issues were raised before the Commission in the employee's Motion for 
Review. While the Commission did not specifically address them, as noted previously, the 
decision of the administrative law judge was adopted. As part of the administrative law 
judge's decision in this matter, she held that medical panel report was adopted which 
specifically established that all treatment and testing which could be deemed as medically 
reasonable had been performed and that the 3% impairment rating was supported by the 
evidence. (Rl at 41-52). As such, the employee's assertions were addressed and the 
decision was supported by proper medical evidence. 
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF 
When the Labor Commission, in its Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Review, 
adopted and accepted the administrative law judge's decision, ample facts were espoused to 
not only address each of the employee's objections, but were sufficient to defeat them. As 
such, the Order should stand and this case should not be remanded for further proceedings. 
12 
DATED THIS _ 2 i day of October, 2003. 
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